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OFFENSE TO OTHERS. By Joel Feinberg.' New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1985. Pp. xix, 328. $12.95. 
Stanley C Brubakerz 
Offense to Others is the second volume of what will surely be-
come Professor Joel Feinberg's magnum opus, a unified four vol-
ume inquiry into the moral limits of the criminal law. Each volume 
deals with a single kind of reason that is offered for restricting lib-
erty: harm to others (volume one), offense to others (volume two), 
harm to self(volume three), and legal moralism (volume four). It is 
an avowedly liberal endeavor, which self-consciously attempts to 
vindicate at least the "motivating spirit" of John Stuart Mill's On 
Liberty, while qualifying its argument "in light of the many accu-
mulated difficulties and criticisms." 
Feinberg departs from Mill in two significant respects. First, 
he abandons Mill's utilitarianism for the method of "coherence." 
That is, he establishes the strength of a proposition by showing that 
its denial would entail a proposition that the reader finds unaccept-
able; or alternatively, he argues that what the reader believes true or 
right has certain implications of which the reader may be unaware. 
"If the argument is successful," he writes, "it shows to the person 
addressed that the judgment it supports coheres more smoothly 
than its rivals with the network of convictions he already possesses, 
so that if he rejects it, then he will have to abandon other judgments 
that he would be loath to relinquish."3 Second, using this method, 
Feinberg acknowledges the need to move beyond "harm to others," 
the only limitation on liberty Mill accepted. Feinberg embraces, 
with numerous qualifications, the principle of this volume, "offense 
to others." In keeping, however, with the "motivating spirit" of 
Mill, Feinberg promises to maintain throughout these volumes that 
the true liberal must reject the principles of "harm to self" and 
"legal moralism" as limits on liberty. 
After defining "offense" as "the miscellany of universally dis-
liked states," Feinberg takes the reader on an imaginary "ride on 
the bus," where he is confronted with six distinct clusters of offenses 
in thirty-one variations. These include affronts to senses (fingernails 
scratching a tablet); disgust and revulsion (coprophagic diners); 
shock to moral and religious sensibilities (smashing of a corpse's 
face by mockful mourners); shame, embarrassment, and anxiety 
I. Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona. 
2. Associate Professor of Political Science, Colgate University. 
3. J. FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS I (1984). 
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(ten stories in all, with passengers engaging in an astonishing vari-
ety of sexual acts). Most readers, it can be assumed, will emerge 
from the bus with their "network of convictions" firmly supporting 
limits on liberty based on offensiveness. 
Drawing from private nuisance actions in the law of torts, 
Feinberg develops the conceptual apparatus for determining when 
offensiveness justifies the limitation of liberty. He urges a balancing 
test. One side of the balance is the "seriousness of an offense," tak-
ing into account the magnitude of the offense, its avoidability, and 
whether one voluntarily exposed oneself to it. On the other side is 
the "reasonableness of the offending conduct," taking into account 
its personal importance to the actor, its social value, the nature of 
the locality, whether there are less offensive alternative avenues for 
the conduct, and whether the actor's motives include spite and mal-
ice. Feinberg then turns to what are probably the most controver-
sial and complex areas of offense to others, "profound offense" 
(which we shall consider later) and "obscenity." 
Most of this volume is devoted to obscenity, considering that 
concept in three distinct senses: as a type of offense felt towards an 
object, as a technical legal term for a type of pornography, and fi-
nally, as a class of impolite words. The most difficult sense to de-
limit, of course, is the first. Here Feinberg skillfully locates the 
concept in popular vernacular and identifies vulgarity and "yukki-
ness" as the most basic components of its offensiveness. These qual-
ities alone, however, do not suffice to render a thing obscene, for 
"[t]he main feature that distinguishes obscene things from other 
repellant or offensive things is their blatancy; their massive obtru-
siveness, their extreme and unvarnished bluntness, their brazenly 
naked exhibition." 
Paradoxically, what is obscene can also be alluring-though, of 
course, not all that is alluring need be obscene. Pornography, 
which Feinberg sharply distinguishes from obscenity, always has 
the character of allure, that is, it is "designed entirely and plausibly 
to induce sexual excitement in the reader and observer." But we 
should call a particular work of pornography obscene only when we 
wish "to endorse some offense as the appropriate reaction to it." 
This offense can be shock at the blatant violation of a moral stan-
dard, or revulsion at the coarseness and obtrusiveness. Feinberg's 
balancing test doesn't justify censoring pornography as such, for 
that would constitute a form of legal moralism. But to the extent 
that the pornography is also obscene and thus offensive, it can be 
controlled to the extent of protecting unwilling audiences and 
children. 
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Not surprisingly, Feinberg finds the Supreme Court's handling 
of the legal sense of obscenity highly artificial. Since its debut in 
this field in 1957, when it declared such material outside of first 
amendment protection, the Supreme Court has called "obscenity" 
what is actually pornography. (Courts have dogmatically adhered 
to this confusion to the point that an obscene gesture cannot be 
constitutionally "obscene," for it does not arouse sexual desire.)4 
But worse than the semantic confusion, the Court did actually em-
brace the censorship rationale appropriate for pornography, the 
moral wrongness of the appeal to a prurient interest. That is, em-
ploying the terminology appropriate to the offense principle, the 
Court actually embraced the principle of legal moralism.s 
Although the Court later added offensiveness to the criteria of legal 
obscenity,6 the basic rationale remained legal moralism. Thus offi-
cial censorship, as in Paris Adult Theatre, could extend into theatres 
that unobtrusively advertise their films and admit only consenting 
adults. Moral soundness, by Feinberg's analysis, lies with Brennan, 
who would limit the reach of state law to the protection of children 
and unwilling adults, that is, the "offense" rationale. 
Obscenity in the sense of impolite words is the final subject of 
his work. Characterized by their conspicuous violation of taboos 
(which may be religious, sexual, or scatological) these words, 
broadly speaking, do "offend." But only in restricted circumstances 
would the offense warrant the criminal sanction. Obscene words 
serve numerous purposes-providing a no-nonsense disphemism to 
balance euphemism, flavoring description with "spice and vinegar," 
expressing strong feeling, giving insult and provocation, and effect-
ing a good joke. Feinberg joins thinkers such as Robert Graves and 
H.L. Mencken in admiring the capacity of these words to extend 
and strengthen the range of expression. He also recognizes that 
under certain circumstances their offense may be more than one 
should have to bear. For the most part, social mores, he argues, can 
take care of confining obscenities to their proper context, and Fein-
berg chooses to focus on only two areas of controversy-fighting 
words and indecencies on the airways. 
Although he affirms the doctrine of "fighting words," he re-
stricts it sharply to what Austin called a "performative utterance," 
words that do something rather than simply express something. 
4. Connecticut v. Anonymous (1977-6), 34 Conn. Supp. 575, 377 A.2d 1342 (1977). 
5. Feinberg would actually characterize the Court's concern as a species of legal mor-
alism, "moralistic legal paternalism," where the alleged immorality of an action consists in its 
moral harm to the actor himself, as in "harm to one's character" or "becoming a worse 
person" (pp. xiii, 183). 
6. Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962). 
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Comparable in that way to declarations of war, "fighting words" 
should be restricted to words that in certain circumstances, by pre-
vailing symbolism, initiate a state of hostility. By virtue of their 
invective effectiveness, obscene insults may sometimes also consti-
tute fighting words, but they can be proscribed only because they 
are fighting words, not because they are obscene. 
Feinberg finds even less justification for banning or even limit-
ing obscenity on the airways. He concludes this work with a criti-
cism of Justice Stevens's reasoning in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,7 
which affirmed federal authority to channel "indecent" language 
over the radio (George Carlin's "Filthy Words" in this case) from 
the hours in which "there is a reasonable risk that children may be 
in the audience." For Feinberg, the offense of getting hit with an 
undesired obscenity, for children as well as adults, is a mere "mos-
quito bite," too trivial for the concern of the law, and one that the 
listener can guard against by simply turning the station off. As for 
the exposure of children to obscene words, Feinberg grants that 
were the words used pornographically, there might be grounds for 
state regulation, but he doubts that momentary exposure to obscen-
ity can ever have a sufficiently marked effect on a child's moral 
character as to justify their proscription. 
To my knowledge, the concept of offense has never been given 
as clear, penetrating, and imaginative analysis as in this book. The 
product of decades of reflection, the work magnificently combines 
the analytic rigor of contemporary philosophy with a poetic gift of 
imaginative illustration and phrasing. Often, as I worked my way 
through an argument and objected, "Okay, but what about x, y and 
z?," I turned the page to discover Feinberg considering not only x, 
y, and z, but zz, and with hypotheticals more threatening to his po-
sition than any I had imagined. In these four volumes, Feinberg 
may achieve his goal of making "the best possible case for liber-
alism" and the work may well deserve a place next to Mill's On 
Liberty. 
Nevertheless, as Feinberg recognizes, even the best possible 
case for liberalism may still fail to persuade. Feinberg's own "co-
herence method"s provides grounds to doubt that liberalism is, as 
he wishes the reader to believe, "true doctrine." Recall that to suc-
ceed under this method, an argument must show the reader that 
"the judgment it supports coheres more smoothly than its rivals 
with the network of convictions he already possesses, so that if he 
rejects it, then he will have to abandon other judgments that he 
7. 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
8. J. FEINBERG, supra note 3, at 18. 
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would be loath to relinquish."9 
Many readers may find that several judgments in Feinberg's 
statement of liberalism do not "cohere more smoothly" than non-
liberal judgments with their "network of convictions." Some of 
these judgments that the reader might find more startling than 
smooth are subsumed under Feinberg's proposition that maintain-
ing a way of life-the tone of the community and character of its 
citizens, preserving as sacred what is held as sacred, encouraging 
the minimal moral requisites that may be necessary for its continua-
tion--can never justify the coercive use of the law as long as the 
activity involves only consenting adults and is not directly thrust 
upon an unwilling public. Or his judgments that the polity must be 
utterly indifferent to the character of citizens promoted by its crimi-
nal law; that the only wrongdoing of which the criminal law can 
take cognizance is a violation of the rights of others; that the "rea-
sonableness" of taking offensew cannot be a factor in assessing the 
offending action's lawfulness. Most of these troublesome judgments 
derive from the very heavy weight that Feinberg gives to the claim 
of liberty and the virtual weightlessness given the claims of politics 
(as preserving a way of life) and virtue (as the cultivation of human 
excellence)-a balance that entails the absolute exclusion from the 
law of what he calls "legal moralism" and "legal paternalism." 
The limited scope of Offense to Others does not force Feinberg 
to establish the plausibility of this assignment of weights, for the 
counterweight to a "liberty to offend" is itself a form of liberty, a 
liberty not to be offended. It is against the forceful claims of legal 
moralism and legal paternalism that the inherent worth of liberty, 
or autonomy, has to be established and assessed, which Feinberg 
promises to do in volume three, Harm to Self In light of this prom-
ise, it would be premature to develop the doubts expressed above 
except to note that with the names of "moralism" and "paternal-
ism," Feinberg unfairly freights his opposition with deeply negative 
connotations. Instead I will deal briefly with his treatment of 
"profound offense," which he considers fully in this volume, and 
with punishment, which oddly is not contemplated as part of the 
projected four volumes of this work. 
The experience of "profound offense" differs from ordinary of-
fense in several respects. It differs by its felt tone (it is more than 
even a gross annoyance; it is profound); by the fact that mere 
knowledge of the offensive action is sufficient to produce the offense 
9. ld. 
10. Beyond the less judgmental factors of intensity, duration, and avoidability of the 
offense. 
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(it is unnecessary to see, hear or smell the offensive action); and by 
what it offends in us (not merely one's sensibilities, but the very self 
that possesses these sensibilities, one's very being). Yet the depth 
with which the offense strikes the "self" does not mean in any way 
that it is personal, for profound offense is expressed impersonally. 
It is not one's own personal good that one is protecting, but a stan-
dard of morality. One is offended because the action is wrong, not 
as with ordinary offenses, where one claims the action is wrong be-
cause one is offended. 
Feinberg does not flinch in showing that there are acts towards 
which most of us would take profound offense-desecration of reli-
gious icons, necrophilic acts, cannibalism, bestiality, mutilation of 
corpses. But, his main concern is to show that his balancing test 
can contain the potential threat to liberty posed by the concept of 
profound offense. The potential might seem significant: the very 
word "profound" suggests a heavy weight in the scales. And since 
offense is taken at "bare knowledge" of the act, not necessarily the 
actual witnessing of the act, its reach is pervasive. Developing the 
danger of such a liberty limiting offense principle, H.L.A. Hart, for 
instance, writes, "[T]he only liberty that could coexist with [this] 
principle is liberty to do those things to which no one seriously ob-
jects. Such liberty is clearly nugatory." 
As Feinberg explains, the real complaint in a case of profound 
offense is the wrongfulness of the act, not one's personal discomfort 
at the knowledge that it is taking place. But then, he notes, we must 
recognize that the nature of the complaint is not really a claim to be 
free from this discomfiture, or offense, but a claim of legal moral-
ism-"that it is necessary to prevent inherently immoral conduct 
whether or not that conduct causes harm or [direct] offense to any-
one." "By definition" such a claim is foreclosed to the liberal. And 
since it is the alleged wrongfulness of the action that leads to the 
offended state of mind, once that action is recognized as not truly 
"wrongful" (because no one's "rights" are violated), offense at the 
"bare knowledge" of the action becomes barren indeed. This reali-
zation, he notes, should prick the bloated righteousness of the pro-
foundly offended and the "moral fervor will seep out like air 
through a punctured inner tube." 
Therefore, except where the profound offense becomes a per-
sonal offense as well (where a widow learns that it is her late be-
loved husband whose face is "smashed to bits in a scientific 
experiment") or where the offensive conduct is obtrusively adver-
tised (a neon sign proclaiming "Cannibalism, Bestiality, Incest. 
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Tickets $5.00 Meals $25. Close relatives half price"), the balance 
scales would not authorize suppression of the conduct. 
For one who is already thoroughly committed to the frame-
work of philosophical liberalism, this argument works. But it is un-
likely to convert those with doubts about the liberal framework 
itself. For if one does take profound offense when another mulitates 
a corpse, desecrates a religious icon, or engages in incest, unless he 
is already dogmatically committed to liberalism, he is likely to find 
Feinberg's observation-that liberals "by definition" cannot act on 
this sentiment-a better reason for rejecting liberalism than his sen-
timents. Liberalism so defined will have a rough time finding a 
"smooth fit" with his present "network of convictions."! I 
Employing the same "coherence method," we might also ques-
tion how well Feinberg's liberalism accords with the concept of 
punishment. It is curious that Feinberg does not intend to consider 
the question of punishment within this work, for there would seem 
to be an obvious need for the justifications for limiting liberty to 
square with those for punishment. And it is doubly curious that 
Feinberg does not see a mismatch--or incoherence-between the 
moral limits of the law articulated in this work and his analysis of 
punishment in his earlier essay, The Expressive Function of Punish-
ment. 12 There Feinberg maintained that the symbolic signification 
of disapproval, indignation, or reprobation is what distinguishes 
punishment from mere penalties, licensing fees, taxes, and more sig-
nificantly, from other forms of officially sanctioned "hard treat-
ments" -severe rehabilitative therapy or medical treatment and 
impositions of strict liability. And quite apart and distinct from 
hard treatment as needed for deterrence or rehabilitation, it is this 
expressive reprobative function, he continued, that justifies hard 
treatment.J3 
Since punishment does truly interfere with the individual's au-
tonomy--or his ability to determine "for himself whether or not he 
will perform an act X or undergo an experience E" -liberalism 
must take a hard look at what purpose it serves. Notably, however, 
the "expressive function" that Feinberg endorsed in this essay can-
not be subsumed under either of the two principles that he now 
II. One with these sentiments might still be persuaded to embrace liberalism if he could 
be convinced by slippery slope or ad horrendum arguments, e.g., that state authority to pro-
hibit necrophilic acts would necessarily entail authority to limit sexual acts to "missionary 
style" between (live) married partners. But, as Feinberg himself notes, such arguments are 
unconvincing. 
12. J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 95-118 (1970). 
13. /d. at 116. That is, the hard treatment, in our culture at least, is necessary for the 
expression of public disapproval. 
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gives as exclusive reasons for interfering with liberty, i.e., the harm 
and offense principles. One can protect others from harm and di-
recti4 offense through the hard treatment required for deterrence 
and rehabilitation. The additional, and sometimes symbolic, hard 
treatment necessary for reprobation would appear superfluous-
and therefore suspect. Using Feinberg's analysis in this earlier es-
say with his present terminology, we should have to conclude that 
the purpose of the symbolic reprobation is the relief of the profound 
offense (albeit one of "bare knowledge") the public feels at the crim-
inal act. By punishing the criminal and thereby vindicating its stan-
dards of right and wrong, the public is relieved of the profound 
offense that it would otherwise suffer. But if Feinberg's analysis in 
this earlier essay is correct,Is then the coherence method forces us 
to make a choice between punishment as civilization has known it-
with the symbolism of condemnation and with proportionality to 
the seriousness of the crime-and liberalism as Feinberg defines it. 
Though Offense to Others frequently examines questions that 
are constitutional as well as moral, Feinberg cannot be accused of 
reading his moral theory into the Constitution, for he carefully dis-
tinguishes moral theory from constitutional theory. For example, 
in criticizing as "absurd" the Court's opinion in Paris Adult Thea-
tre, Feinberg concedes, parenthetically, "but of course if is always 
possible that it is the Constitution that is absurd, not the five-man 
majority". Since the Constitution does clearly contemplate true 
"punishment"I6 as opposed to mere "discouragement" of crimes, 
we must conclude that if Feinberg is right about the nature of liber-
alism, then the Constitution is not a liberal document. 
14. As opposed to "bare knowledge" offense. 
15. Though the point is not crucial to my present argument, I should note that while 
Feinberg is in the right ballpark with this essay, he is not quite on base. Just as the profound 
offense taken at bare knowledge of certain acts is itself relatively insignificant compared to the 
depth of our judgments that the act giving offense is truly wrong, here the need for public 
expression is itself relatively insignificant compared to the depth of judgments that the pun-
ishment is itself right, i.e., that for his crime, the criminal deserves hard treatment and shame. 
16. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 6 & 10; amends. V & VIII. 
